21 April 1965

Mr. Marcello Truzzi
Department of Sociology
McGraw Hall
Cornell University
Ithica, New York

Dear Mr. Truzzi:

It was a pleasure to talk to you by telephone today. I hope that we can work out some sort of consultant arrangement to our mutual benefit.

As I indicated, we are charged with the "impossible" task of seeking social science principles applicable to the problem of motivation of indigenous populations for counterinsurgency activities. We shall have one somewhat theoretical chapter written in simple lay terms. It is probably here that your particular interests would most closely dovetail our needs. Possible there would be a further application in a problem approach section which we also plan.

In any case, as soon as we develop an outline of our rough needs we can call or write you and seek your advice, a brief paper in response to our queries, or your personal consultation here in Washington.

As indicated, I am enclosing a Consultant Background Date sheet for our records and so that we can have a fee rate set for you. I anticipate that the rate would be $35-$40 per working day (8 hours). Travel fare and per diem are above this figure(s).

In addition to the "BDS", I enclose a little paper designed to describe in summary the counterinsurgency milieu. This may help you to understand the setting in which the social science principles we isolate will be applied. I also enclosed a very tentative outline of our plans for the content of the report we shall submit. Finally, I enclose our official task statment.

It is important to realize three things: 1)the urgency of this task, (it must be accomplished within weeks), 2)the fact that the setting is counterinsurgency (but not necessarily Vietnam--what we report must be generally applicable to all societies or at least all underdeveloped societies), and 3) what we report must meet the practical needs and level of understanding of readers not trained in the social sciences and without any special tools for measurement or manipulation outside of their own common sense and the clues we can give them.

I appreciate your willingness to discuss all this with us. I shall
report with pleasure our conversation to Phil Springer. Phil, by the
way, would like very much to see you come down this way during the summer
and has been making appropriate inquiries. I cannot report his luck or
lack of luck, but he is trying with enthusiasm.

Sincerely,

John L. Houk

JLH/bab

Enclosures:
    Background Data Sheet
    The Counterinsurgency Setting
    Tentative Outline
    Task Statement

QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

1. How is equity (objective or perceived) related to morale or a
   feeling of well-being re one's group.

2. Is the perception of inequity more motivating than the percetion
   of equity? That is will people attack an inequitous system more
   strongly than they will defend an equitous one?

3. What are the conditions under which people will defend an inequtous
   social system?

4. Is equity important in all values or in just some?

5. What is the role of tradition in the perception of equity? To
   what extent and for what reasons are traditional inequities accepted?
   Are there any laboratory analogues of this?

3. less beneficial or more inequitous alternative

Shils, the Lerner +   The Policy Sciences

1. <u>Task Title</u>: Principles of Human Motivation Relevant to Counterinsurgency (MOTIVATION)

2. <u>Sponsor</u>: CDC

3. <u>Consumers</u>: CDQ; CDCSWA; CDCCAA, CDCIAS, CDC Control Group; DCSOPS

4. <u>Principal Investigator</u>: John L. Houk

   <u>Location of Main Effort</u>: Washington, D.C.

5. <u>Scope</u>:

   a. <u>Objective of Research</u>. To review and summarize current knowledge of salient factors which influence human (individual, group and societal) behavior relevant to popular motivation in counterinsurgency.

   b. <u>Background</u>. The Combat Developments Command has a requirement for up-to-date synthesis of knowledge on human motivation upon which the development and evaluation of doctrine for counterinsurgency operations can be based. This requirement is explicitly laid down in the CDC Document <u>Program for Analysis and Development of U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Organization (U)</u> (CONFIDENTIAL) and this task is designed to support that program. It derives specifically from "Task #3" of Annex E of the CDC program. There is a critical and urgent need for such a summary of social science information on motivation to replace the many types of popular wisdom regarding human nature and society which are commonly and strongly held, but often diverge greatly from experimentally derived evidence. Such a summary, focussed on the discerned needs of counter-insurgency operations, should provide a realistic base for the development of a body of doctrine applicable to counterinsurgency.

   c. <u>Method of Approach</u>. A review of psychological, anthropological and sociological literature will be conducted to identify the most salient of the factors which motivate individuals and groups, and the relationship between these factors and the kinds of individual and group behavior relevant to counterinsurgency. Social science experts in communications, culture change and political behavior will also be consulted to confirm, elaborate upon and adapt the information to discerned recurring problems of counterinsurgency and for easy comprehension. This information will be summarized in the form of tentative principles to guide the formulation of doctrine.

      (1) The identification of some recurring problems of motivation in counterinsurgency operations (based on operations designated by the sponsor as most important to their requirement), the essential review of literature based on a framework of inquiry deriving from the important needs of counterinsurgency, and the application of salient factors and principles extracted from the literature to the discerned problems of motivation in counter-insurgency activities will constitute three phases of the research.

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(2) The research will be organized by topics so that conduct of research can proceed topic by topic thus permitting the informal delivery of pre-report increments of the findings from time to time as requested and agreed upon. Ongoing research will also provide a basis for advisory service to the Sponsor both prior to and subsequent to submission of the final report. Such advisory service can be provided directly from the SORO research staff or through social scientist consultants with special and appropriate expertise. This service constitutes a portion of the task and the extent to which it is used will have an effect upon ongoing research schedules. Extensive use of this advisory service may assist in the solution of the Sponsor's immediate and urgent problems, but may also result in the need for extension of the expected due date for the final report.

6. Estimated Professional Man Years Required:

FY65 - 1 PMY
FY66 - to be determined

7. Subtasks:

I. Review of principles of human motivation relevant to counterinsurgency. (Expected to be completed by 31 July 1965, unless extended due to higher priority of advisory services or upon agreement with sponsor.)

8. Coordination:

ODRR&E
HumRRO
J.F. Kennedy Center, for SW, SWS
FSI
Department of State
CONARC

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THE COUNTERINSURGENCY SETTING

- John L. Houk

<u>Definition</u>. Counterinsurgency--The entire scope of actions (military, police, political, economic, psychological, etc.) taken by or in conjunction with the existing government of a nation to counteract, contain, or defeat an insurgency. (<u>Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage</u>)

<u>The major actors in the situation.</u>

1. The enemy

   a. hard-core insurgents

      (1) mobile units (quickly transferable to any location)

      (2) regional troops (usually live or formerly lived in the local village or town, but now operate within a larger region and sometimes can claim no particular place as home)

      (3) local militia (local villagers, sometimes part-time)

   b. Other military and paramilitary units

      (1) political organization militants

      (2) special interest groups

   c. Political party organizations

      (1) regional

      (2) district

      (3) local (cell)

   d. Sympathizers

   e. Paid intelligence agents

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2. The great mass of civilians living in the country

    a. The nationals of the country or the predominant ethnic-linguistic group

    b. minorities (e.g., tribesmen--such minorities may be a "majority" in a given area)

    c. a few "foreigners"

3. Counterinsurgent forces (also organized at regional, district and local levels)

    a. Local government regular forces

    b. Local government Special Forces or equivalent

    c. U.S. Special Forces and Advisors (if present under U.S. policy)

    d. Assorted irregular forces, paramilitary groups, and private armies (e.g., local self-defense corps, youth groups, political groups, etc.)

    e. Sympathizers

It should be noted that in previous modern insurgencies, an estimated seven percent of the population was actually committed to physical support of the insurgency. Over 90 percent of the population was apathetic, sympathetic to one side or the other, or resentful toward both sides. Those sympathetic to the insurgency in attitude did not reach the point of commitment in deed during the course of the insurgency. Of the 7 percent which form the hard core, only 40 percent understand the goals and political orientation of the insurgency and the remainder are committed because of various idiosyncratic responses to the existing social situation. The

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advantages enjoyed by insurgency thus do not lie in numerical superiority.

Rather they acrue because of public apathy or vague discontent, mobility,

the fact that most of the insurgents are from the areas in which they fight

(and know the terrain and have personal friends and relatives in the area)

while most of the counterinsurgent regular forces are from outside the area,

the vague or concrete promises of a new day and a new deal which they can

profer to the local populace, and because they hold the initiative.

The hard-core insurgents and their political counterparts act as follows:

The hard-core insurgents first try to infiltrate the population,

then they attempt to organize units around any issue that affects local

interests. With control over a number of such units some sort of "govern-

ment" or quasi-governmental apparatus may be established. It is only after

such shadow government establishment that actual commitment to their cause

on the part of the populace is sought. This they then seek by a combination

of carrot and stick. Efficient government, community improvement, protection,

attack upon or destruction of groups and interests which oppose them, and

punishment of those who resist or who remain uncommitted are among their

weapons (and these are precisely the same weapons used by the counterinsurgent

forces and legitimate government). After a sufficient number of the popu-

lation stand committed, the insurgents can expect support in the form of

intelligence, food, "safe homes," etc. Within a village or region, the

insurgents will maintain covert agents who will report intelligence, inform

on enemies and set up legitimate government supporters for assassination.

Not all of this is "clean cut." Sometimes the insurgents "have" the village

by night while the government forces "have" it by day. In such cases

terrorist activity is common.

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The Action:

Insurgency usually begins in remote areas where government control is either absent or inadequate. Establishing a base or bases in such areas the insurgents begin their process of expansion and infiltration. Urban centers are not neglected although---because of the coercive force of government centered in cities---really organized fighting is usually a later or even last stage. During earlier stages, underground cells will be established and recruitment activities launched in cities. Riots and other disruptive activities will be sponsored and organized. Acts of terror will be engaged in. Such activities are not so much to gain control of the city as to tie down government forces which might otherwise be concentrated in the areas of real insurgent operations. They are also designed to alienate the population from the government by the demonstration of government "weakness."

In the rural areas, fighting is usually sporadic, involves mostly small units, and consists of ambush, hit-and-run, and sniping operations with occasional pitched battles. It centers in the countryside around villages, small towns and sometimes and in some places, in and around fortified hamlets built after the British usage in Malaya. It is in this type of setting that the insurgents enjoy the advantages previously noted (knowledge of terrain and people).

Within this framework, insurgent warfare is a nasty business. It is truly grass-roots---frequently swamp grass. The enemy is not easily recognized. He mingles with the people. Indeed, he is one of them - a brother, a lover, a father, a son, or a friend: a fellow villager. He wears no

uniform or insignia. He fights you from unseen vantage points, ambush, raids, and sniping as mentioned. Collectively, he may "take" the village and demand his own support and the elimination of defense paraphenalia (e.g., barbed wire). The Counterinsurgent forces may then "retake" the village and demand the rebuilding of defense paraphenalia and the punishment of those who supported the insurgent. Frequently, the counterinsurgent-- not being of the area--misunderstands the people and is misunderstood by them. Too often he is not fully committed to the government and cause he serves. Sometimes he is arrogant, sometimes corrupt. Often counterinsurgent forces are unable to clear the area of insurgents or to afford protection to villagers from terror and reprisal. Even if the counterinsurgent forces are physically present in strength, they cannot always protect the individual from enforcer squads and the underground.

The people stand mute and bewildered. Almost inevitably their regard for government (never very strong in developing nations) goes down as they see the affects of fighting on their homeland and friends. They do not identify with insurgents as such but they know them and they sometimes sympathize with them. More often, they are merely apathetic. In insurgent operations such apathy can be perceived by government forces as hostility. Positive popular support (intelligence, etc.) is a prerequisite to success. Counterinsurgent forces must have information about the enemy, must have compliance and cooperation, and must deny all these things to the insurgent.

The Counterinsurgency response:

The local, legitimate, government sends out military hunter-killer units and tries to strike, contain, or destroy the insurgents whenever and

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wherever they can. The following are examples of the _tactical_ operations and requirements which involve motivation on the part of the local population(s):

1. <u>Obtaining intelligence</u> with regard to insurgent movements or location (which involves support of the local population in giving appropriate valid information).

2. <u>Military Operations</u>
   a. <u>Repelling</u> insurgents during an attack (which involves perhaps active assistance by local residents or at least compliance and cooperation with counterinsurgency forces and hostility toward and noncooperation with insurgents).

   b. <u>Pursuing</u> insurgents after such an attack (which involves the giving of information by local populations, good will toward counterinsurgency forces, and again, perhaps, some active assistance within local capability).

   c. <u>Smoking out</u> pockets of rebel activity (which involves giving of information, guiding counterinsurgency forces through local terrain and to possible pockets of activity, and local assistance).

   d. <u>Attacking</u> insurgent forces (which involves giving of information, good will, compliance and cooperation, and, to the extent possible, active assistance).

3. <u>Psychological Operations</u> - actions designed to induce the emotions, attitudes or behavior necessary for accomplishment of counter-insurgency goals.

4. <u>Civic Action</u> - nation building activities (economic development, community improvement, etc.) undertaken or sponsored by the military forces.

Considerable <u>strategic</u> effort is spent by the local government to win the support of its people. Apart from the military effort to protect the population from insurgent activities, these efforts are usually centered on improving sanitation, education, health, and transportation facilities. When U.S. policy directs support, many U.S. agencies assist the local government in these long-term efforts. For the American military this comes principally under the heading of "civic action." Smaller and un-sustained efforts also come under the heading of civic action.

18 May 1965

Mr. Marcello Truzzi
Department of Sociology
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

Dear Mr. Truzzi:

I am enclosing a check from The American University in the amount of $120.00, in payment for your time as a consultant for our Task-MOTIVATION Project.

Your contribution to the Theories of Equity phase of this research is very much appreciated. The success of this project depends upon the participation of qualified individuals like yourself.

Very sincerely,

Philip I. Sperling
Deputy Director

Enclosure:
  AU check #081748 for $120.00

PS/bab